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Abstract
This paper collects several notes I've written over the last year in an attempt to work
through my dissatisfactions with the ideas about representation I was taught in school.
Among these ideas are the notion of a 'world model'; the notion of representations having
'content' independent of the identity, location, attitudes, or activities of any agent; and
the notion that a representation is the sort of thing you might implement with datastruc-
tures and pointers. Here I begin developing an alternative view of representation whose
prototype is a set of instructions written in English on a sheet of paper you're holding in
your hand while pursuing some ordinarily complicated concrete project in the everyday
world. Figuring out what the markings on this paper are talking about is a fresh problem
in every next setting, and solving this problem takes work. Several detailed stories about
representation use in everyday activities-such as assembling a sofa from a kit, being
taught to fold origami cranes, following stories across pages of a newspaper, filling a pho-
tocopier with toner, and keeping count when running laps-illustrate this view. Finally,
I address the seeming tension between necessity of interpreting one's representations in
every next setting and the idea that everyday life is fundamentally routine.
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Introduction
This paper collects some short essays I've written informally over the last year as I've
tried to work through my dissatisfaction with the theories of representation I learned
in school. Although the ideas and exposition are only moderately polished and despite
their lack of worked-out technical proposals, I am circulating them in this form since they
seem to me to articulate some concerns and intuitions that have become widespread in
the field over the last couple of years. In reading them it might help to have read the
papers of mine and Chapman's listed in the bibliography.
The notion of representation obviously labors under a long philosophical history.
These days, though, it also labors under an appreciable technical history, one handed
down in the form of an increasingly routinized technical practice of building computer sys-
tems that in various ways construct, maintain, and manipulate 'representations.' What
I find most interesting about the subject of representation, indeed about artificial intel-
ligence research as a whole, are the interactions between the philosophical and compu-
tational issues. I have regularly found that philQsophical analyses suggest useful inter-
pretations of difficulties that arise in my technical practice. And I want to believe that
our technical practice can help with philosophical inquiries as well. Although I've tried
to write in plain English, my principal motivation has been to explore some places where
technical questions appear to align with philosophical answers. I don't yet understand
how to convert these answers back into technical practice, but I want to.
These notes make both negative and positive suggestions. On the negative side, I
am against two related and widespread (though certainly not universal) ideas about
representation, namely 'semantics' and 'world models.' These words get used in various
ways, so here are some rough definitions.
The notion of semantics holds that a representation has a 'meaning' or a 'content'
independent of the identity, location, attitudes, or activities of any particular agent. (For
an ambitious exception see Barwise and Perry.) At the risk of collapsing some distinc-
tions, this meaning or content is often understood in terms of a systematic, objective
relationship between the representation itself and states of affairs obtaining in the world.
A world model is a component of some physically realized computational system, an
object whose internal structure stands in a systematic, objective, analogical relationship
to states of affairs presumed to obtain in the world. Some process maintains the model as
the world changes; reasoning about the world is a matter of inspecting and manipulating
the model. The building and maintenance of world models regularly forces implementers
into a seemingly unresolvable trade-off between overly restrictive assumptions and in-
tractable computational complexity.
On the positive side, I would like to make two suggestions about how people use
symbolic representations. The first is that people use symbolic representations to help
them make sense of particular situations. Given a symbolic a representation there isn't
much you can do to 'understand' it until you're faced with a particular situation in which
it might be relevant.
(Whatever the form of the representation, whether written or spoken or displayed on
a video monitor, I shall speak of it, or more precisely its configuration of symbols, as a
'text.' I'll use the word 'representation' when I mean to emphasize the actual material
object: the sheet of paper, the speech signal, or the video image. I'm afraid that this use
of the word 'text', although perhaps not standard, has become natural to me through
exposure to contemporary French philosophy. I hope I haven't been too corrupted by
French perversity to express myself clearly to a technical audience.)
My second suggestion is that what a given text is talking about is a fresh problem in
every next setting. The 'work' of relating a text to a concrete setting-looking around,
poking into things, trying out alternative interpretations, watching someone else, getting
help-can be either 'mental' or 'physical,' though it is best not to distinguish. Relating a
text to a concrete setting takes work because the text might be relevant to the situation
in a great variety of ways. The text has a certain amount of, so to speak, 'play.' The more
play a text has, the less one can conclude in advance about how it might be relevant to
actual situations. The intuition is that texts have a great deal of play, so much that one
must simply postpone the majority of one's interpretative effort until the time comes.
This is just the opposite of extracting a 'meaning' from a text as soon as it arrives. The
only way to explain the point is through examples.
(1) You're on a city street trying to get to a party. You've got a sheet of paper in your
hand with directions written on it. The directions say "bear left." Now you've got work
to do. What does "bear left" mean with me standing just here, at this intersection, now?
It may not be obvious. (If you don't believe me, go to Boston, get on Commonwealth
Avenue in Back Bay, and head toward Kenmore Square.) No law of nature connects the
phrase on your sheet of paper to the aspects of your physical surroundings that should
motivate the details of your actions. The person who wrote the instructions, lacking
detailed knowledge of precisely where you'd be standing or traffic conditions or your
having the sun in your eyes, had to count on you to fill in for their underspecification of
your next move. If all streets were laid out in standardized, discrete patterns then one
could rely on simple, deterministic rules to relate instructions to the streets one comes
across. In reality, though, street layouts defeat any attempts at simple models. Boston's
streets are famous for their inexpressible tangles, but some pretty odd things happen
within the supposedly simple geometry of midtown Manhattan as well.
(2) I'm trying to find a friend's house from a set of directions. I received the directions
by computer mail and had printed them out so I could carry them with me in the car. I
knew the main road well enough but I knew nothing about the residential streets leaving
it. The last two paragraphs read:
About a mile up from the intersection, look on the left for Elk Tree Road--it's
a dirt road with a little bus stop at the end. Follow Elk Tree past the first
left (Big Tree WAY) to the mailboxes and take the middle of the three-way
fork on the right, Upper Big Tree ROAD.
My place is the first one on the left, #27. Park on the left shoulder near my
white Honda, and come down the steps and up the stairs to my front deck.
(If you went to the main door, you'd get my landlords, not me.)
I had the sense to check my odometer at the intersection so I'd know when "about a
mile up" was coming. Even so I somehow missed Elk Tree Road the first time. The bus
stop is obvious enough if you're looking for it, but it's a little way up the dirt road and
obscured by foliage. The most difficult part, though, concerned the "three-way fork on
the right." When I got to the mailboxes (dozens of them, in fact) I had to find some
way to interpret the scenery as "the three-way fork on the right." Unfortunately, I could
only count two roads on the right. After much backing up and looking around, I decided
that a large driveway roughly straight ahead was the third road. Setting off along the
"middle" road, I looked for the first place on the left. The road snaked down a hillside
with many houses on the right. Finally I came to a house on the left. I couldn't find
any street numbers (no surprise out here) but there was definitely a white Honda parked
outside. I parked and got out and looked for the place that "come down the steps and
up the stairs to my front deck" was talking about. I found such a place but it led me
to the side door of a cluttered garage. A great deal of searching and asking around
followed. Even though something was clearly wrong, that white Honda made me reticent
to abandon any of my previous interpretations. To make a long story short, the middle
branch of the three-way fork immediately branched into Lower Big Tree Road steeply
down to the left and Upper Big Tree Road steeply up on the right. A large hand-painted
sign for Upper Big Tree Road clearly marks the split, but I was already looking for the
first place on the left. Writing this now, I realize that it makes perfect sense for Lower
Big Tree Road to branch steeply down and Upper Big Tree Road to branch steeply up,
but at the time, I didn't give the right branch any thought at all since I simply did not
see the branch as a branch. If you're there looking at the branch as a branch it's hard
to imagine how it looked to me, but it never occurred to me that I had another choice
of roads to make. The sign must have occupied a reasonable portion of my visual field,
but I was already looking for a house, not a sign, and to the left, not the right. (It takes
great skill to make a sign that people will see despite themselves. I'd like to understand
precisely how the standardized colors and placements of official road signs, such as the
excellent green US Interstate Highway System signs, help in noticing them.) In short,
I saw what the instructions told me to see. Told about a "three-way fork to the right"
and unable immediately to see such a thing in that place, I worked, successfully, to see
it. Told about "the first [place] on the left," I unquestioningly saw what the instructions
implicitly told me was there, namely the road on which my friend's house was located.
(3) A friend recently taught me to fold origami paper cranes. In walking me (and a
couple other people) through the various steps, she often had to explain by some combi-
nation of words, pointing, and demonstrations where and how to fold next. Not having
grown up around origami, we didn't have a ready vocabulary for the intermediate forms
of a folded crane. The intermediate forms don't look much like cranes. Indeed, much of
the magic of crane-folding is that the paper keeps taking on unexpected new identities
as you fold it, even long after you've gotten reasonably proficient. These forms can be
hard to talk about because they're importantly asymmetrical in nonobvious ways. Even
demonstrations are only of limited use if you can't see these asymmetries for yourself. In
the course of her explanations my friend said things like "put your finger in the pocket,"
"fold it back to make a boat," and "make the legs skinnier." Making each of these
metaphors refer to parts and aspects of the folded paper always took considerable effort,
even though it was always wholly evident in retrospect.
In the "pocket" case, you can't see the paper as having a pocket (two of them,
actually) unless you hold it in a particular orientation and visually, and then
physically, separate the flushed edges into peculiarly asymmetrical groups.
In the "boat" case, the paper becomes boatlike out of nowhere once you
manage to reverse the sense of two nearly invisible internal creases and then
carefully induce a third.
In the "legs" case, you're holding a flat diamond-shaped hunk of folded paper
that has a slit from one corner of the diamond to its center, but that slit isn't
obvious if you hold the paper in the flattened-out form the diamond shape
invites. The cranes themselves don't have legs. The "legs," most improbably,
become the neck-and-head and tail of the crane shortly afterward.
In each case, the instruction was clearly metaphorical. The speaker hoped to identify
certain parts and aspects of the folded paper structure by likening them to pockets,
boats, and legs. It was not obvious at first to any of the apprentice paper-folders what
structures the speaker was referring to. In fact, much of the speaker's job was to get us
to look at our partly-folded origami cranes in just the right way, so that certain parts
and aspects would stand out as units for us. (The ones who first 'got' the legs showed the
others by grabbing one 'leg' in each hand and making them 'walk.') She was teaching us
the skill of seeing our paper as having a pocket, a boat, or legs. Although we got better
at this skill, it never stopped taking work. The work only became more routine.
(4) The final example comes from my experience teaching people to program com-
puters. If you've long been comfortable sitting in front of a computer terminal, it's easy
to be mistaken about what you're actually teaching. You've got all kinds of neat theory
in your head about keyword arguments and normal order evaluation, but none of that is
much help to someone who hasn't yet even got the idea of being 'in' the editor as opposed
to being 'in' the interpreter. So I sit the student at the keyboard and tell them what to
look at and what to type. As they become fluent with the mechanics, my instructions
grow more abstract.
At first it'll be "Type open paren then DEFUN space .... " Often I'll have
to explain that "paren" means "parenthesis" or that I'm not asking them to
type the words "open" and "paren." Sometimes I'll even have to point out
where the parenthesis keys are. Later, though, I'll be able to say "Let's define
a function called FACTORIAL."
When they're learning to read code, you have to point out that there are
conventions about indentation that result in common types of code having
characteristic shapes.
Later on, when teaching about using function or class definitions to implement
abstractions, you can talk abstractly about hierarchies and common abstrac-
tions all day, but it won't do much good until you explain that two hunks of
code that look alike are often good candidates for a common abstraction.
In each case, explaining the formalities doesn't do much good until you've managed to
connect this knowledge to the student's eyes and fingers.
As these examples illustrate, my prototypical type of representation is natural lan-
guage, whether as spoken utterances or written texts or so-called 'internal speech.' In
each case, figuring out what in the situation the text was talking about always took work.
This work often involved creative improvisation and sometimes it required laborious pok-
ing at paper and keyboards, looking around, trying over and over, asking for help, or
making use of the proddings of a teacher. The work was the work of relating natural
language to concrete situations: identifying the things the words were mentioning, seeing
materials under metaphorical descriptions, and heuristically associating visual patterns
with verbalized technical abstractions. The work required to make sense of "turn left"
or "put your finger in the pocket" or "define a function" might differ greatly in different
settings or under different conditions.
Does this mean that I disbelieve in AI representation schemes that resemble various
extensions or generalizations of first-order logic? Yes it does. I don't resent their formal-
ity. Formality is a tool that can be used or abused. Instead, I resent their lack of any
account of the work involved in relating a representation to the outside world. Simply
positing a correspondence between "John" and John is no help at all.
I want to concentrate on representations written on paper. The image of standing in
a kitchen or on a street with a written text in your hand is a good reminder that relating
texts to circumstances requires work and that this work requires understanding in some
measure what you're doing. You have to understand what you're doing since the text
certainly doesn't. Obviously representations often influence your actions, but you don't
understand what you're doing in virtue of owning them. This point is supposed to apply
equally to all forms of representation, not just writing. That understanding does not
reside in representations is a difficult and consequential idea. The paper's later stories
will explore this idea in the context of 'internal language.'
(For readers who know my previously published work with David Chapman, I should
point out that the idea of representation I'm discussing in these notes is different from
the idea of "indexical-functional representation." From a philosophical point of view,
I'm not sure that the entities and aspects of indexical-functional representation should
be called representations at all.)
Many words in these essays are in scare quotes. Since scare quotes are not very pop-
ular, I should explain briefly why I do this. Double quotes are always simple quotations.
Single quotes, though, indicate that I mean to call a word into question. Even though
I usually don't want to use the single-quoted word myself, I also don't mean to insult
the people who do. Simply quoting a word does not demonstrate its uselessness, nor is
it intended to. When I quote a word, I'm asking you to momentarily suspend your rou-
tine technical reception of it and listen to its connotations as an ordinary English word,
sodden with history and metaphor. For example, in quoting 'content' I want to call up
images of containers and contents. In quoting 'structure' I want to recover associations
to buildings, to construction, and to other cognate words and ideas. In quoting 'world'
I want to draw attention to such manifestly peculiar technical uses of this word as the
phrase 'world model.' In each case, attention to words reopens the question of what
metaphors are appropriate and useful in formulating technical vocabulary for explaining
the lives of agents, whether natural or synthetic.
Nine fairly independent notes follow.
The homunculus and the orbiculus is a fairly glib assault on the notion of a world
model, placing it squarely in a long philosophical tradition of attempting to explain
the human ability to act competently in the world by pretending that the relationship
between person and world is reproduced inside the person's head. This sort of explanation
is curiously seductive because it plays to the principal strength of current computational
technology, namely building abstractions inside of computers that are almost entirely
cut off from the outside world. But it's also fairly easy to find reasons to doubt such
views. Not much purpose is served in dwelling on the point, though, since I suspect these
doubts will suddenly seem completely obvious once viable alternatives start coming on
the market.
Writing as bad and good metaphor for representation makes a first attempt at defining
my thesis. It contrasts two very different ways in which one might take written texts as
prototypes of representation. The first, "bad," way focuses on the physical properties of
written texts, a long list of which are shared by the sorts of representations one imple-
ments with datastructures inside of computers. I suggest that this view of representation
derives from a long line of misguided philosophical biases. The second, "good," way of
taking writing as a metaphor for representation concentrates on less immediate aspects
of written texts. These concern the fact that both the text and your surroundings are
outside of you and the consequent necessity of doing work to see the world as being what
the text is talking about.
Why we watch videotapes dissects an example of this point. It concerns a videotape
of two people assembling a sofa from a kit using a set of instructions printed on a sheet
of paper. These people continually had to work together to make the instructions refer
to the physical objects they found in the box and they didn't always get it right. The
ways in which they made mistakes led to useful hypotheses about the nature of plans.
The instructions were a representation of action, but in using them the people had to
supply their own interpretive effort and overall comprehension of their task. The process
of using the instructions was thus heavily influenced by the nature of interpretation.
A story about photocopier supplies also concerns written instructions. In this case, a
secretary is justifiably annoyed because somebody has put laser-printer dry toner in the
photocopier. What happened and why? At issue is the selective use people must make
of the representational materials that surround them. I put the case for the culprit's
defense, arguing that the phrase "dry toner" on a bottle is not 'ambiguous' in a way that
anybody could be expected to notice, even if evidence serving to identify and resolve the
ambiguity is readily available elsewhere on the bottle's label. One would like to demand
that photocopier users be 'careful,' but it's hard to formulate the demand very usefully
given that such a problem could hide behind any of the vast number of unarticulated
assumptions that form the background of any such activity.
A story about a road sign concerns two words, "Connecticut Avenue", on a road sign.
It is a story about a mistake I made because I had not yet learned some fine points of
using road signs when I first learned to drive. It's a trivial point that the connections
between symbols and things differ depending on the occasion; this story emphasizes that
the methods by which we connect symbols and things themselves differ depending on the
occasion. The methods at issue in this case are bound up with broader legal ideas that
assign juridical identities and official, designed conventions to roads, lanes, intersections,
signs, and so forth.
A story about some instructions at a performance in an art gallery is another story
about instructions, this time a single fairly long sentence spoken (actually hollered) by
one person to a group of others. These instructions did not function very well because
they were delivered in a context that did not permit their recipients to see, or even
imagine, what in the setting the instructions could have been talking about. Some sort
of schematic conjuring up of a context often seems necessary to make much sense of
an utterance, but here no such conjuring was possible since the structures to which the
instructions referred had been built specially for this performance and thus had never
been seen by the people to whom the instructions were addressed.
Two stories about keeping count recounts two stories about trying to keep a running
count in my head during a repetitive activity. In the first story I was assigning successive
letters to sections of a thesis chapter; in the second story I was counting laps I was
running on a track. In each case an odd effect occurs, which both I and others have
noticed elsewhere: when it came time to increment the count, I couldn't remember
whether the count in my head was the previous index or the next one. I don't know
exactly what accounts for this effect, but it is relevant to this paper's themes in that it
reflects in a very simple way the plain ambiguity of representations. A remembered letter
or number doesn't have its meaning written on it; relating it to one's activity requires
interpretive work that can, like any interpretation, suffer from the possibility of multiple
interpretations.
A story about my routines for reading the Sunday Globe is a story about an instruction
that I hypothesize I issued to myself in the course of reading the newspaper one Sunday
morning. The pattern of activity in which the instruction participated had long since
become perfectly routine. Nonetheless, the way in which the instruction went wrong, I
argue, reveals that it was something very much like an English imperative and not, for
example, a precise specification of my intended action stated in anything like a program-
ming language. In this case, a change in the environment led me to make a different
sense of an ambiguous phrase than I used to.
A story about the file cabinet in my office is a similar story with a different outcome.
Once again there's an instruction I hypothesize I issue to myself in the course of a certain
routine pattern of activity, namely fetching stuff from the file cabinet in my office. Here
a change in the environment led to a recurring mistake since, I suspect, this phrase
continued to pick out the same drawer in the file cabinet even though it should now have
picked out a different one. The juxtaposition of these two stories compels some tough
questions about how routine use of internal speech works, or even what it means. All
I hope to establish so far is the idea that it exists. The work of making sense of your
representations in every next situation never goes away, no matter how routine this work
becomes.
The purpose of all these stories is not to prove any general propositions. Instead, the
stories invite you (perhaps even induce you) to be aware of similar phenomena in your
own experience of everyday representation-use. There is immense power in the reciprocal
influence between computational investigations and awareness of the manifestations of
technical issues in everyday experience. Parallel pursuit of these two kinds of inquiry
will, I believe, lead to deeper understandings of why our everyday life is the way it is,
why people are the way they are, and why the robots we hope to build can take certain
forms and not others.
The homunculus and the orbiculus
In the old days, philosophers accused one another of associating with a sneaky in-
dividual called a homunculus. From Latin, roughly "little person." For example, one
philosopher's account of perception might involve the mental construction of an entity
that 'resembled' the thing-perceived. Another philosopher would object that this entity
did nothing to explain perception since it required another person, the homunculus, to
look at it and determine its identity and properties. Philosophers have been arguing
about this issue for centuries. Computational ideas have a natural appeal to philoso-
phers who care about such things because they let one envision ways of 'discharging' the
homunculus by, for example, decomposing it into a hierarchy of ever-dumber subsystems.
I think, though, that the tangled ruts of argument about homunculi distract attention
from a more subtle and telling issue. If the homunculus repeats in miniature certain acts
of its host, where does it conduct these acts? The little person lives in a little world, the
host's surroundings reconstructed in his or her head. This little world, I decided, deserves
a Latin word of its own. So I talked to my medievalist friend, who suggested orbiculus.
One way to say "world" is orbis terrarum, roughly "earthly sphere." But orbis, I am
told, extends metaphorically in the same ways as "world" in English: one might speak
of the world of a peasant or a movie director, meaning roughly their existential world,
"the world they live in." So the orbiculus is one's world copied into one's head.
Where can we find orbiculi in AI? All over. A 'world model' is precisely an orbiculus;
it's a model of the world inside your head. Or consider the slogan of vision as 'inverse
optics': visual processing takes a retinal image and reconstructs the world that produced
it. Of course that's a metaphor. What's constructed is a representation of that world.
But the slogan would have us judge that representation by its completeness, by the extent
to which it is a thorough re-presentation of the corresponding hunk of world.
You'll also find an orbiculus almost anywhere you see an AI person talk about 'reason-
ing about X.' This X might be solid objects, time-extended processes, problem-solving
situations, communicative interactions, or any of a hundred other things. The phrase
'reasoning' about X suggests a purely internal cognitive process, as opposed to more
active phrases like 'using' or 'acting upon' or 'working with' or 'participating in' or
'manipulating' X. Research into 'reasoning about X' almost invariably involves all-out
representations of X. These representations will be judged according to whether they
encode all the salient details of X in such a way that they can be efficiently recovered and
manipulated by computational processes. In fact, discussions of these 'reasoning' pro-
cesses often employ metaphors of actual, literal manipulations of X or its components.
In practice, the algorithms performing these abstract manipulations tend to require a
choice between extremely restrictive assumptions and gross computational intractability
(see Brachman and Levesque 1984, Chapman 1987, Hopcroft and Krafft 1987).
If you favor slogans like 'using X' over slogans like 'reasoning about X,' someone will
ask you,
"But we can reason about things that aren't right in front of us, can't we?"
Mentalism offers seductively simple answers to many questions, and this is one of them.
According to mentalism and its orbicular slogans, reasoning about a derailleur proceeds
in the same way regardless of whether the derailleur is in front of you or in the next
room. Either way, you build and consult an orbicular derailleur-model. If having the
derailleur there helps you, it is only by helping you build your model.
This is, of course, contrary to common experience. As we all know, the first several
times you try to reason about a derailleur (1) it has to be sitting right in front of you and
(2) you have to be able to look around it, poke at it, and take it apart. I've disassembled
and reassembled several derailleurs. Yet I just tried and failed to figure out how a
derailleur changes gears, or even to list the parts involved. I've got the rough idea, but
that's all. I could do it right away it if you gave me a derailleur, but sitting here with
my notebook there's no way. The question arises, why aren't several disassemblies and
reassemblies of derailleurs enough to build a mental model of them? Why not just one?
One receives several answers to this sort of question, but my favorite (and also the most
common) is what I call the gratuitous deficit response. For example,
"Maybe you build a model but it decays."
"Maybe there isn't enough capacity."
Look what we have here. We have a theory that makes everything easy for itself by
arraying before itself encodings of every salient fact in the world. And then we have this
sort of lame excuse that pops up to disable the theory when anyone notices its blatant
empirical falsehood, without at the same time admitting that anything is fundamentally
wrong with it. Maybe the computational complexity of reasoning with realistic world
models is trying to tell us something about why it's harder to think about a derailleur
in the next room.
Maybe what we store when we gain experience with a derailleur or a city or a recipe
is more specific. Perhaps it is more biased to the specific things you've had to remember
in the course of the activity. Perhaps it is more closely tied to your goals at particular
moments of the activity. Perhaps it is more organized around the experience of the
individual situations that arise in the course of the activity. These are difficult ideas.
The question is complicated and messy and poorly worked out. It's hard. But that's to
be expected. Expecting it to be easy is a sign of addiction to the easy answers of the
orbiculi.
Writing as bad and good metaphor
for representation
The notion of symbolic representation is near to the hearts of most everyone in arti-
ficial intelligence. Indeed, within the technologically informed human sciences, cognition
is almost universally understood to involve, in some fashion or another, the manipula-
tion of assemblages of symbols called representations. The vast majority of this research
assumes symbolic representations to have certain properties: they are
objects (neither events nor processes),
passive (not possessing any sort of agency themselves, though cfBirnbaum),
static (not apt to undergo any reconfiguration, decay, or effacement, except
through an outside process or a destructive act of some agent),
structured (composed of discrete, indivisible elements whose arrangement is
significant in some fashion),
visible (can be inspected without thereby being modified), and
portable (capable of being transported to anyone or anything that might use
them without thereby being altered or degraded).
(Latour makes a similar list.) Although the cognitivist understands symbolic represen-
tations as abstract mental entities, observe that all of these properties are shared by
texts written on pieces of paper. Indeed, words like 'structured,' 'inspected,' 'modi-
fied,' 'transported,' and 'altered' must be interpreted metaphorically, by extension from
similar operations performed on physical materials such as paper, in order to apply to
abstractions inside of computers. Observe also that most of these properties are either
deficient or absent for spoken utterances, which evaporate as quickly as they are issued
and which can only be decomposed into discrete elements with a certain amount of wish-
ful abstraction. Thus we can speak, within limits at least, of a writing metaphor for
representation.
This conception of representation-as-writing is topical for several reasons, some within
artificial intelligence and some in other fields. Within the field, the growth of the con-
nectionist movement has lent urgency to the seeming conflict between symbolic manipu-
lation and the sorts of relatively simple, uniform, statically and locally connected, highly
parallel hardware generally imagined to compose the human brain (see for example El-
man, Fodor and Pylyshyn, Hutchins, Rumelhart et al). Within anthropology (broadly
speaking), the work of Goody, Ong, Harris, Latour, and others has challenged views of
cognition that, they claim, tend to make universal principles out of certain psychological
and social phenomena found only in literate cultures. (For formal citations see the end
of the paper.)
This section has three purposes. First I want to present evidence that symbolic rep-
resentation in artificial intelligence is, historically, modeled on written texts, as opposed
to (say) photographs or spoken utterances. Then I want to describe some ways in which
writing is a bad metaphor for symbolic representation. These arguments implicate some
prevalent technical methods. Finally I want to describe some ways in which writing is a
good metaphor for symbolic representation. These arguments suggest some new technical
directions, a few of which are being taken up in various projects.
Representation as writing
Much of the relevance of philosophy and linguistics to AI derives from the many habits
of thought that AI has inherited, largely unchanged, from these fields. Roy Harris, among
others, has argued that ideas about representation in philosophy and linguistics have been
heavily biased by writing. He observes that these fields have given a central position to
those aspects of human utterances that survive a conventional written representation.
One might read in a textbook,
Suppose that John says to Mary,
Please close the window.
and this will be taken to be a sufficient specification of some (usually hypothetical)
event. We do not normally wonder, and only very exceptionally are we told, about
several aspects of John's action:
* his tone of voice,
* his articulation of the various phonemes,
* the shape of his intonation,
* the timing of the various elements within the utterance,
* the timing of his utterance relative to other actions and events,
* his position relative to Mary and the window,
* his posture,
* his gestures,
* his facial expression,
* the direction of his gaze,
* whether and when he has caught Mary's gaze.
(For the horrors of trying to make written notations of these things, see Heritage or
Levinson for an introduction to Jefferson's notation system used in conversation analysis.)
Given that these aspects of normal speech regularly affect the import of utterances,
a written sentence must be considered a terribly poor representation--at best a coarse
idealization--of a spoken utterance. But philosophical and linguistic analyses have almost
always proceeded solely on the basis of this idealization, a tradition that Al has carried
on. The point is not that any of these fields talk about writing; only that they concentrate
on the aspects of representation that writing normally captures. See Harris for a detailed
critical history of the role of writing in the philosophy of language.
It is understandable that tone, articulation, and the rest should have been left out
of account by philosophers and linguists whose principal medium of communication is
written scholarly texts. This tendency has been reinforced by the practice of reasoning
about hypothetical scenarios such as John's request to Mary. When one describes a
hypothetical situation in writing, the aspects of that situation that one's writing practices
don't capture don't ever get specified. As a result, theories will naturally tend to lean
on distinctions that writing captures, not on the many distinctions it doesn't.
That's philosophy and linguistics; how about AI? AI's technical practice has been
influenced in a hundred mutually reinforcing ways by philosophical and linguistic habits
of thought. But among the many routes by which the writing metaphor into AI practice,
one particular moment stands out, namely when Newell and Simon invented symbolic
programming.
Here's what happened. Almost all the domains that Newell and Simon have stud-
ied, especially in their earlier work, have been domains like cryptarithmetic in which the
'world' with which an agent interacts is made up entirely of a sheet of scratch paper.
Newell's production system models do not contain separate mechanisms for the scratch
paper and for the agent's 'short-term memory.' No separate process parses the ordered
markings on an image of the paper and extracts the information needed to decide which
productions to fire; instead that information-all the information available on the scratch
paper and all its salient relationships-is always automatically available to the mecha-
nism. As a result, Newell's notion of short-term memory is, to put it mildly, influenced
by the imagery of scratch paper. Newell and Simon invented symbolic programming in
order to implement the sorts of structures and operations that their models specified.
List structures, like scratch paper, and like the symbolic structures of all subsequent AI
programming languages, have all the aforementioned properties of writing and none of
the aforementioned properties of speech.
Writing in the head
People invented writing for several good reasons. One of those reasons is that you
can do things with paper that you can't do in your head. And there are good reasons
why you can't do those things in your head. One is that there's nothing in your head
that's anything like paper.
AI research is very often caught in a pattern whereby mechanisms that seem ex-
tremely 'expressive' and 'powerful' and 'flexible' and 'general' turn out not to scale up.
Let's return to the properties that AI has ascribed to symbolic representations--objects,
passive, static, structured, visible, and portable-and consider how they lead to difficul-
ties of scaling and implementation.
Symbolic programming languages such as Lisp clearly endow their datastructures with
all six properties. It implements these properties using pointers. Pointers make objects
visible to processes. Pointers connect the components of structures. One can effectively
transport a structure by 'passing' a pointer to it. Structures only change when processes
change them. Pointers are typically realized as binary encodings of memory locations,
but what's important is the metaphor of pointing. Pointers do not obey any locality
beyond that of their own connectivity. Thus they are eminently reconfigurable. Every
variable in every process and every component of every structure is capable of pointing
at any object in the machine at any time. (For related discussions of these points, see
Chapman's Connections, encodings, and descriptions.)
At least two sorts of difficulties arise in computing with pointers. The first is that
they require their implementation medium to be infinitely reconfigurable. Thus they pull
hard both against the locality of the physical space in which that implementation medium
must be realized and against the locality of connection of any particular machinery. Ev-
erything can't be physically connected to everything else. This difficulty manifests itself
in various ways. On serial machines we observe it in the complexities of dynamic storage
management and its interactions with storage technologies (especially the tendency to
virtual-memory thrashing and the resulting need for compacting and localizing garbage
collection). On parallel machines we observe it in the complexities of shared-memory
management and message routing (especially its probabilistic nature and the resulting
need for complex and hard-to-understand synchronization and arbitration protocols).
The second characteristic difficulty of computing with pointers is at the level of al-
gorithmic complexity. Just as you can write any symbol you like on the next bit of
blank paper, a pointer places very little constraint on what might be found at the other
end of it. Even when pointers are typed the types typically have large ranges. As a
result, algorithms suffer from the combinatorial arbitrariness of the structured objects
with which they must reason. Thus the exponential terms that stubbornly crop up in
analyses of algorithms sufficiently general to account for the seeming range of human
reasoning abilities.
If writing is a good metaphor for symbolic representation, then, it is not because we've
got things in our heads that're objects, passive, static, structured, visible, and portable.
These properties of writing don't help us to understand human use of symbolic represen-
tation in general because they're precisely the properties of written texts that are specific
to written texts. Far from picking out the essence of symbolic representation, they dwell
on the physical activity of using a written text: inscribing, passing about, inspecting,
storing, and destroying. Writing was an important innovation precisely because it was
the first technology of symbolic representation that permitted these extraordinarily use-
ful forms of activity. Activity of these forms has to go on outside our heads because it's
not practical for them to go on inside our heads.
Writing as representation
In what ways, then, can writing serve as a model of the essence of symbolic represen-
tation? Consider a situation in which you're using a sheet of paper with some writing
on it to help you organize a concrete activity. Perhaps you're using a recipe to help you
cook dinner. Or perhaps you're using some directions to help you get to a party. The
sheet of paper has a funny paradoxical position in this scene.
Even though it's a physical object with a definite size, mass, and location
relative to the other materials in your surroundings, it plays its role--at least
qua representation-entirely through your interpretation.
Even though it seems to speak perfectly clearly about the materials of this
particular situation, it only manages to do so because of the work you do to
figure out what in your surroundings it's talking about.
The sheet of paper in your hand is both part of the material situation and doubly
removed from it, separated from it by you yourself.
It underdetermines the sense you make of it because it is separate from you-
after all, someone else faced with the same materials under the same condi-
tions would probably do something different.
And it underdetermines what in the situation it picks out because you are
separate from your surroundings-after all, you could probably use the paper
equally well with different materials under different conditions.
As with written texts, I want to claim, so it is with all symbolic representations.
Where a written text is outside you in a physical sense, all symbolic representations of
whatever form are outside you in a particular metaphorical sense. In your head or in
your hand, all texts are fundamentally indeterminate.
This view of symbolic representation conflicts with the widespread proposal--mani-
fested by, for example, the model theory of first order logic-that a text has a 'meaning'
independent of the activity of any individual. The world does not come innately par-
celled out into the categories we find mentioned in written texts. Instead, people use
representations to help them make sense of particular situations. What a given text is
talking about is a fresh problem in every next setting.
(For those who care about such things, this is what Jacques Derrida means by the
word "writing." His assertion that philosophers have suppressed writing has caused much
confusion when interpreted more closely to the sense of representation-as-writing that I
denounced earlier. For introductions to Derrida's philosophy see Culler and Norris. I
have also been influenced by Garfinkel's ethnomethodological ideas about representation
use. For an introduction see Heritage.)
Likewise, 'understanding' a text is not a matter of possessing something called its
'meaning.' Instead it is the ability to use the text in the situations one encounters-or
perhaps the situations one might encounter. It does not matter whether an individual's
efforts to make sense of representations in successive situations are infallible, systematic,
consistent, or readily articulable. All that matters to the average representation-user is
that the job get done.
This idea has many consequences for computational theory. To describe cognition as
a matter of processes operating upon symbolic representations is much less help than we
had once hoped. Indeed, the relationship between internal processes and their internal
symbolic representations is qualitatively the same as the relationship between a whole
rational agent and a sheet of paper. Even if we put symbolic representations inside the
heads of our robots, regardless of their properties and regardless of whether we intend
our robots as models of human beings, we have not qualitatively reduced the problem of
specifying the essence of rational action.
These consequences are negative. What can we say that's positive? For the moment,
we can speculate about alternate technical forms that theories of symbolic representation
might take. I believe that our ability to use symbolic representation is formed in inter-
action with the practices of representation use we encounter in our everyday activities.
These abilities have as many forms as there are forms of representation use around us:
speaking and hearing give rise to internal speech, creating and inspecting physical sym-
bols give rise to visualization, and so forth. The 'internal' processes-I quote the word
because I doubt if they're best considered as wholly internal, rather than as elements of
complex forms of interaction-aren't precisely like the 'external' processes because the
insides of our heads aren't like the outsides. Instead, they are strongly shaped by the
machinery we have in our heads and more generally by the practicalities of physical re-
alization of complex forms of activity. For example, I strongly suspect that internalized
speech is far more consequential than internalized writing because our machinery is far
better suited for reproducing speech than writing. (For a great deal of insight about the
nature of internal speech see Wertsch's survey of the Vygotskian school.) If this is true,
then many properties of speech that philosophy and linguistics have treated as marginal
phenomena-tone of voice and intonation come to mind--will have to be readmitted to
our theoretical center stage.
Why we watch videotapes
One evening recently I learned something valuable about plans as Lucy Suchman,
Randy Trigg, John Batali, and I were watching a videotape of two fellows, whom we'll
call John and Paul, assembling a sofa from a kit. The point of this story isn't so much
what I learned as how I learned it. It's a story about the value of a cultivated discipline
of videotape watching. In particular, it's a story about learning to locate where you end
and others begin.
In this tape, John and Paul make a mistake. Fairly early on in the process, they
put some washers where they don't belong. They discover their mistake much later on
when they find they don't have enough washers to put the last few parts together. The
question is, why did they make their mistake?
Their mistake certainly wasn't caused by inattention to the instructions. They spend
the first 12 minutes of their 40-minute-long project just reading the instructions, relating
each line of instructions to the materials they've removed from the box. They work
carefully and try to form articulated reasons for their actions. This makes their mistake
a compelling study in what people do with representations.
The kit provides them with a collection of dowels, bolts, nuts, and washers for putting
this sofa together. These parts first come into play when they form the "base" of the sofa
by affixing two "rails" and a "base spreader" to two pre-assembled rectangular "base leg
assemblies." Step A of the instructions reads:
Place a 7/16" x 2" dowel (1) in each end of the front and rear rails (2) and
attach to the leg assemblies (3) as shown. Secure each end with 3 1/4" bolts
(4), washers (5), and nuts (6). Place the base (short) spreader (7) between
the leg assemblies and secure each end with a lag screw (8) and washer. Be
sure all the bolts are tight.
The parenthesized numbers correspond to the list of parts in the upper left corner of
the page of instructions. At issue is the second sentence, which (dropping the numbers)
reads:
Secure each end with 3 1/4" bolts, washers, and nuts.
The issue is where the washers go. This sentence is not clear. Is there a washer under
the head of the bolt, under the nut, or under both? They end up putting a washer at
each end of each bolt.
After a great deal of stepping frame by frame through several segments of the tape we
finally found the moment where John and Paul made their mistake. After much effort,
they are finishing up with the first sentence of the instructions:
Place a 7/16" x 2" dowel in each end of the front and rear rails and attach to
the leg assemblies as shown.
This takes them about five minutes. Before they're quite done with this, though, Paul
turns his attention to the bolts, washers, and nuts. After sorting them out under himself,
he lifts one corner of the structure and inserts a bolt in its pre-drilled hole. John, however,
would clearly like to finish the first step. With Paul occupied with the hardware, he seems
at a loss for something to do. He repeatedly tries to account for what Paul is doing. He
asks Paul whether he's experimenting and if that's the next thing for them to be doing,
but he doesn't get much acknowledgement from Paul.
At this point something fascinating happens. John picks up the instruction sheet,
which has been lying by his side. While John is inspecting the instructions, Paul removes
the bolt he has inserted into the side of the base assembly, brings it down to the floor,
puts a washer on it, lifts it back up, and re-inserts it in its hole. John then looks up from
the instructions and back toward Paul.
This sequence was entirely obvious in retrospect even though we had already been
through this section of tape several times without any of us noticing it. Perhaps, I figured,
we had here an explanation of the mistake. Maybe John, occupied with the instructions,
had simply not noticed Paul placing the fateful washer on the bolt.
Just now, though, Lucy said something important, to roughly this effect:
Where in the tape is the warrant for your assumption that the matter of
whether a washer belonged under the head of the bolt was an issue for them?
It's clearly an issue for us, but is it an issue for them?
We went back through the tape and, indeed, we found no evidence that they had ever
thought about it. They were quite concerned with whether there should be washers under
the nuts, but they never appear to entertain doubts about the heads.
This is interesting. They have read the instructions carefully with every appearance
of understanding them. And when they eventually realize they are in trouble they are
able to read the exploded diagram to discover that it does not portray washers under
those bolt heads.
The truth, it turns out, is more interesting than my detective story about flukes of
synchronization. It has to do with the kind of use that John and Paul were making of
the instruction sheet. Certainly they made frequent reference to the instructions; the
instructions influenced everything they did. Nonetheless, it is not really accurate to say
that they were 'following' the instructions.
The issue isn't whether the instructions precisely specify their users' every move.
John and Paul's enactment of the first sentence, "Place ... ," takes about five minutes,
so they're filling in some details, to put it mildly. Even given this, though, one might hold
that the fine structure of their activity was, say, an expansion of standard patterns of
activity mentioned implicitly in the instructions, perhaps on the model of the computer-
programming notion of a subroutine call.
But, no, it wasn't like this. Rather, John and Paul used the instructions as a sort of
oracle. When an issue arose, they would address it to the instructions, working to achieve
their coherence, their reference to the materials at hand, and their character as specifying
the activity. Naturally a large number of issues arose, as to "what now," choices among
similar parts and seemingly symmetrical possibilities for placing them, and so forth.
But plenty of other issues did not arise. One issue that did not arise is whether
the bolts attaching the rails to the side assemblies had washers under their heads. We
might imagine that Paul, in sorting out the hardware, was working from first principles,
deciding to place a washer under the bolt head because bolt heads should not have to
turn against wood. But we have--at least so far-no more evidence that he made a
positive decision to this effect, a positive choice of this move as against other possible
moves, than we have that he made a positive decision to maintain his balance or to keep
breathing.
Once I thought about this, I decided that John and Paul couldn't help but use the
instructions in this way. When they first read through the instructions, before assembling
the sofa, John read the second sentence,
Secure each end with 3 1/4" bolts, washers, and nuts.
out loud, without evincing any sense that there was anything problematic about it. It
made sense. Securing wooden parts with bolts, washers, and nuts is something both of
them know about. We have no evidence that their understanding of this sentence was
sufficiently detailed as to specify numbers of washers-per-bolt, and plenty of evidence
that it was not.
John and Paul had no more reason to question how many washers the sentence spec-
ified than they did to question how many ends the rails had, whether "each end" really
meant each end of each rail, whether one should double the nuts, or any of countless
other matters. Nor do we know if they were clear about, say, which direction the bolts
should pass through the parts. No doubt if we stopped them and asked they would've
come up with the right answer pretty quickly, but that's a different matter. In short,
the sentence is no more-and no less--'ambiguous' in the problematic regard than it is
in any of these other, more peculiar ones. We could go on all day listing and clarifying
the ambiguous aspects of the instructions. No sentence, or any other hunk of text, has a
clear, definite, unique meaning that anyone could finish specifying, whether by playing
twenty questions or in any other way. A sentence is a mutely indeterminate string of
symbols until it is brought to bear on some actual situation. Plans are no exception.
If John and Paul were using the sofa-assembly instructions as oracles rather than
as direct specifications of action, a new and interesting problem opens up: in virtue of
what were John and Paul able to make this use of the instructions? It's not exactly
that they already knew what they were doing. But they did possess some fundamental
competence which the instructions served only to supplement. The instructions played
this supplementary role by, among other things, directing John and Paul's attention to
materials they were already capable of comprehending and by answering specific queries
John and Paul were already capable of formulating.
Critical to my having learning what I have just reported was Lucy's advice to try
separating issues-for-us from issues-for-them. Lucy picked up the habit of making such
distinctions from the ethnomethodologists. These people are utterly obsessive empiricists
who have developed and articulated a practice of distinguishing the interpretations for
which you have warrant from the ones for which you don't.
Central to the ethnomethodologists' practice of interpreting videotapes (or anything
else) is the idea that the members of a social setting engage in a continual, cooperative
construction of the situation's reality-a fiction, so to speak. If we, as observers trying
to understand the methods by which people get along, join the participants in taking
these fictions for granted, we won't even be able to ask our scientific questions, much
less answer them. Likewise, if we read our own concerns and questions back into the
activity we are studying, as if its participants' reality transparently subsumed ours, we
will certainly ask only wrong questions. In short, we must try to locate the boundaries
between ourselves and the people on the videotape.
That we can never finish demarcating these boundaries is a consequential phenomenon
in itself. It has important negative implications for any methodology that would present
a finished, objective set of rules for studying human activity. It also has important
theoretical implications as a positive fact about human relationships. In the course
of our cooperative activity, we rely in endless ways on the imperfection, indeed the
superficiality, of our separation. Before we have our own private thoughts, before we
can fall prey to insidious and tragic failures of communication, before we even feel the
need to engage in positive acts of imparting information to one another at all, we dwell
together in a radically inarticulable common world whose roots reach bottomlessly into
our commonalities of environment and biology and cultural heritage. Insofar as this
common experiential world is the site and basis of so much of our learning, its properties
must be central to any scientific theory of human cognition.
A story about photocopier supplies
When I used to have jobs where I worked behind a counter, I was always amazed how
oblivious people are to signs. If the machine was going to be back up in an hour, you
could put a big red sign with stars and arrows
THE MACHINE WILL BE BACK UP AT MIDNIGHT
anywhere you liked and people would still walk up to the counter and ask "when will the
machine be back up?" This can get on your nerves.
Today's text is a manifestation of this effect.
Date: Tue, 17 May 1988 17:05 EDT
From: J
To: All-AI
Subject: Xerox copiers and Lazer Printers
Due to someone's IGNORANCE, CARELESSNESS, or LACK OF PATIENCE,
SOMEONE PUT DRY IMAGER FOR THE LAZER MACHINE INTO THE
XEROX MACHINE on the 8th floor. These supplies, although both dry im-
ager, ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE!!! It says on the box it comes in
(and on the bottle itself) which machine it is for.
We were warned by the Xerox people before that if this happened again, they
may discontinue servicing our machines-not to mention the cost of having it
corrected (or maybe having to get a replacement).
If there is a problem with the xerox or lazer machine on the 7th floor and you
do not know how to correct it or have a question, see D.... She is in charge
of the overall care of those machines as I am the machines on the 8th floor (I
can be located at ... ).
Because of one person's lack of resourcefulness (he/she could of went down
to the 7th floor or seen me or D), we are all suffering! If it is after hours and
you are not sure what to do, it is better to do nothing than ruin a machine.
-J
In the old days, when the photocopier needed dry toner, one would look around the
room, see the bottle marked "dry toner," open the machine, find the reservoir marked
"dry toner," and put the contents of the bottle into the reservoir. Sometimes they would
put the toner in someplace else, or they'd put something else into the toner reservoir,
and these are very bad things to do to a photocopier, but they didn't happen that often.
Nowadays, though, many rooms with photocopiers in them also have laser printers in
them. And laser printers also take dry toner. Except in the copier/printer room on the
8th floor, the two types of dry toner are incompatible. So what happens? Exactly the
same thing as before. Except that the bottle marked "dry toner" one happens to come
across first might or might not be the correct dry toner.
Does this happen because people are too lazy to check whether it's laser or copier
toner? After all, as J points out, "It says on the box it comes in (and on the bottle
itself) which machine it is for." Do they just go irresponsibly ahead putting laser toner
in the copier figuring it's probably OK? Did they plough ahead despite a nonspecific but
conscious uncertainty about how to replace the toner?
Although we must appreciate J's situation, I think all these hypotheses are unnec-
essary. Put yourself in the place of someone to whom the photocopier is asking for dry
toner. This person was making dozens of different moves in the course of their actions. So
far as this person could tell, any of these moves could be mistaken in dozens of different
ways. The actual problem, namely that the bottle marked "dry toner" was not actually
the correct substance, is pretty obscure, as if somebody parked a car nearly identical
to yours a couple spaces down. In the case of the wrong car, some discrepancy would
no doubt force itself upon your attention before you got too far along. Sure there was
evidence of the mistake readily available, but what was the poor victim supposed to do,
make a complete list of all the things they might be doing wrong and go looking for
evidence to rule out each one?
The problem, in short, is only obvious in retrospect. Types of dry toner are obviously
an issue for the person who had to deal with the consequences of somebody's having
gotten it wrong, and for us as theorists now, but it doesn't follow that we can expect it
to be an issue for anyone who tries to replace dry toner in the copier. It's not necessarily
even that the person "didn't know what they were doing." Someone could become
perfectly proficient at replacing toner in copiers and still run afoul of this difficulty,
simply because whether they had the right type of toner had never become an issue for
them. The arrival of the laser printer would invalidate one of the implicit assumptions
of their toner-changing routine, but they wouldn't necessarily have any way of knowing
this.
I interpret this story in terms of a larger theme about what people do with represen-
tations. Recall the story about the two guys trying to assemble a sofa from a kit. Given
an instruction that was ambiguous about the placement of bolts, they did what seemed
right without it ever being an issue for them where exactly the bolts belonged. This case
is similar but a little more complicated. I suspect that the person in question, seeing
that dry toner was needed, looked around the room for containers marked "dry toner."
Finding such a container, they proceeded as if nothing was wrong. As far as they could
tell, nothing was wrong. The phrase "dry toner," to us, is 'ambiguous' between "laser
dry toner" and "copier dry toner." But that ambiguity is only an ambiguity for us. For
all we know, "dry toner" could also be ambiguous in an unlimited variety of other ways.
One might say, the person in question should have read the rest of the label. But
the world is full of representations; how do you decide when to stop reading them all
and start doing something? We might hear this should-have as an instance of the Ur-
heuristic: look around. Looking around has a way of making things become issues for
you. But the person wasn't in doubt and had no reason to be ...
The dispute can go on and on. In the end, all we can do is stop moralizing and fix
the equipment. Make all the toner bottles so different that it's physically impossible to
install the wrong stuff. Or try to reduce the risk by training everyone. Or resign yourself
to locking up the toner bottles.
Here, by the way, is a second recent manifestation of this phenomenon:
Date: Thu, 19 May 88 11:21:30 EDT
From: D
To: 7ai, 8ai
Subject: [something else]
I cleaned up the ninth floor printer area and carted off the two boxes of paper
for recylcing. Please note that there are approximately 10 opened reams of
3-holed paper up there. Perhaps the literacy rate is low for ninth floor printer
users.
A story about a road sign
I was 17 and hadn't been driving very long. Having grown up in a sterile outer suburb,
I was unfamiliar with the conventions and street knowledge, so to speak, involved in city
driving. One particular evening I was driving to someplace in the northern suburbs of
Washington DC, an area to which I had never been, though having grown up nearby I
had heard about it and knew the names, but not the relationships, of the major roads.
I was heading west on Adelphi Road (or perhaps it was University Boulevard) and I
wanted to take a left on Connecticut Avenue, so as to be heading south toward the city.
The road had curved and gone through some difficult shifts and branchings, though, so I
was aware of being somewhat disoriented. In particular, I was unsure whether I was still
on Adelphi Road. As a result, I was investing great effort in inspecting the territory for
evidence.
At one point, I saw in the median a short, wide sign on a pole, white with a black
border and black sans serif lettering, reading "Connecticut Avenue" (or perhaps "Con-
necticut Ave"). "Aha," I said to myself, "I'm already on Connecticut Avenue!" A
queasy uncertainty accompanied this insight, but then 17 is an age of more or less per-
petual queasy uncertainty. The sign was about 50 feet short of a major intersection, but
this did not make much of an impression on me since, as far as I was concerned, I had
figured out where I was and was in the right place. Incongruities accumulated over the
next several miles, though, and I realized I had made a mistake. I then quickly figured
out what the sign meant and in general what such signs mean.
It is often said that the relationship between representations and reality is mediated
by social conventions. This slogan is often interpreted as meaning that society posts a
table of conventional symbol-thing correspondences to which one can refer in decoding
a particular symbol. Quite the contrary, the social conventions around representations
concern the methods by which one is to discover what things a symbol is talking about
in particular situations. In this case, I had to learn a method for relating certain kinds
of signs to a certain setting's materials (roads, intersections, turn lanes, etc). I was aided
in this by some important ideas I brought to the situation: the idea of a 'road' as an
individual, of my being 'on' some particular road, of roads meeting in 'intersections', of
'looking for' the intersection between the road I'm on and some other particular road, and
of some as yet unidentified intersection 'coming up.' More implicitly, I was exploiting the
fact that road signs are designed to support the projects people commonly have along
roads and that my particular project just then, of looking for a particular road, is a
common project. Since the issues for me just then were few and clear, interpreting the
sign as being there in order to support my project made it easy to formulate a new idea
about the sign's significance.
Furthermore, I could formulate my insight as concerning 'such signs', not just 'that
sign', since such signs stand in a designedly generic relationships to 'such roads' and
'such intersections' when one is engaged in 'such tasks.' The sign's success in standing
in a generic relation to the surrounding materials and to my purposes nearly effaces
the sign's identity as a particular object. I relate to the sign, now that I've acquired the
necessary skills, the way I relate to 'such signs', as opposed to the way I would relate to an
improvised sign hand-painted on scrap lumber and nailed to a tree out in the countryside.
Someone who had never looked for a road would, I expect, have a more difficult time
making any sense of the "Connecticut Ave" sign's relation to the surrounding territory,
or even perhaps formulating the idea that the sign had a relation to the surrounding
territory.
I would like to understand how explicit an idea one needs of the conventional nature
of the relationships of official signs to their settings. The officialness of the sign is part of
a larger network of official facts: the existence of a road or intersection is a plain, ordinary
fact out in the forest somewhere, but in a city it is also a legal fact. In Boston we joke
that the roads started out as cow paths, but we have a sense that at some point they
changed their status, acquiring names and street numbers and significance vis-a-vis laws
such as "right turn on red after stop." The cow-path story, however apocryphal, reflects
something important about the nature of these roads. The roads and intersections can
only be legal facts because they are, or lend themselves to construal as being, in some
broad sense, already facts for individuals engaged in the 'merely physical' activity of
getting somewhere by following roads.
The black-and-white "Connecticut Avenue" sign signaled its official status, in part,
through its neat, standardized look. Somehow we understand that only official agencies
(which can be governments, corporations, schools, clubs, or just about anything in var-
ious contexts) have access to the technology to give things that neat, standardized look
and to place them in such convenient, appropriate, significant places as the medians on
major roads. Unscrupulous advertisers sometimes play on this assumption, making their
newspaper ads look like real news columns or making their envelopes look like those con-
taining official documents or announcing themselves to tourists as "information centers"
and the like. The aim, presumably, is to encourage the same generic, automatic, trusting
response which such a look normally occasions in other, situations of routine interaction
with 'official' representational materials. People are certainly capable of seeing objects
as 'made to look like' something they're not, but only once such an idea has occurred to
you.
A story about some instructions
at a performance in an art gallery
Last Saturday a friend and I went to the MIT reference gallery to see a weird per-
formance put on by the current pair of resident artists. The performance took place in
a windowless room that's about twenty by thirty feet with quite a high ceiling. When
we arrived the doors hadn't yet opened, so we and the rest of the audience milled about
outside. Finally the time came and the person who worked behind the desk wandered
out into the lobby where everyone could see her and yelled something like, "OK the doors
are open." Then as people were drifting toward the door she moved into the middle of
the crowd and yelled something fairly complicated that went something like this:
You can sit on the chairs or you can go to the back wall and look through
the windows or you can go up on the balcony, but don't lean against the side
wall.
None of us could actually see the inside of the performance space as she was saying all
this, so we had no way of knowing what she meant by windows, side wall, back wall,
balcony, etc. One could feel the crowd being uncomfortable about this, many of them
turning to their neighbors in an attempt to get clarification. I found myself trying to
visualize the scene, but I had no idea how to place even the "side wall," much less the
balcony and the windows. Windows? Both the impossibility of visualizing the scene and
the effort spent trying seemed to make the instructions unusually hard to remember, as
if they were nonsense syllables or Zippyisms, and several people could be heard repeating
parts of them over to themselves or to their neighbors.
I found this very amusing, and adopting a gently ironic imitation of the register and
diction of the yeller I said something like, "you can stand between the monsters but don't
sit on the toadstools." Not very many people got the joke, I'm afraid, and especially not
the yeller, who replied, if you see any of those things in there please let me know. I found
this interesting in itself. The person who yelled those instructions was obviously quite
familiar with the room, and even though she couldn't see it just then any better than
any of the rest of us, she presumably had no problem visualizing what she was talking
about and no evident awareness that others were having a problem.
Once we got in there, there was an audible rush to make the words attach to parts
of the room, which was dark and full of elaborate and peculiar wooden structures. The
"side wall" is immediately there on your right, verifiable by the readily visible chairs
along it, and the "balcony" could be found along the back wall with a little scanning.
The "windows" weren't at all obvious; they were windows in the wall supporting the
balcony, behind which one could stand. I suggested we go for the balcony; although no
stairs were immediately visible it was pretty obvious where they should be and others
were already headed that way ahead of us.
In this story, the peculiar relationship between the instructions and the physical
setting disrupted a part of language understanding that normally goes unremarked. The
yeller's experience of "You can sit on the chairs or ... " differed from the audience's
in that only she had a working familiarity with the network of structures and spatial
relationships it referred to. For the audience these relationships, lacking any reference to
any familiar or imaginable setting, were difficult to remember in the way that arbitrary
formal symbols are hard to remember in laboratory experiments. Heaven knows how
these crazy artists might have set up this space!
The situation resembles the mnemonist's method of loci: if someone tells you about
something that happens in a familiar space--or a space for which you have a familiar
model, like imagining someone else's cooking story taking place in your own kitchen-its
objects and actions get themselves 'placed,' in a way that can be either quasi-visual or
kinaesthetic or, more commonly, both. And they tend to stay where you put them. If
you can't put the various elements of the story in their places you won't be able to hang
onto them, just as we had trouble hanging onto the performance space's balcony and
windows. I don't understand any of this.
Taking language out of context
This story connects to a larger theme about language. I want to believe that an
utterance doesn't really have anything like a 'meaning' outside of the particular concrete
context it's involved in, but this makes it a little hard to explain how we can talk in the
abstract about people and things that're distant or hypothetical. Consider the sorts of
examples that linguists ask you to evaluate out of any context, like those sentences about
abstract Johns and Bills where you're supposed to say whether it's OK for the pronoun
to refer to (a) John (b) Bill. Often I've had the experience of finding an interpretation
not-OK until I do a fair amount of work elaborating hypothetical contexts. And I'm not
even talking about my habit of imagining weird 'pathological' contexts that can make
any utterance "OK," but just interpretations that the linguists and I alike find OK in
retrospect.
I suspect that the only reason that such exercises get consistent results, when they
actually do, is because of the consistency across a segment of culture about the foggy
default contexts that people will construct to make the sentence make any sense at all.
The ability to do this at all is quite culture-specific; many anthropologists have had
the experience of administering such tests, either grammar tests or syllogistic reasoning
tests, and having their informants insist on knowing who John and Bill (or whatever
names they use) are, on bringing in additional 'irrelevant' information from their own
experience, and so forth. These people just haven't been trained in 'reasoning' about
the poorly-sketched decontextualized quasi-situations that're evoked by grammar and
syllogism quizzes. (See Cole and Scribner.)
Heath (1986) discusses how this capacity arises. She has studied middle-class child-
raising customs, especially the way that middle-class parents use rituals like bedtime-
story-reading to introduce children to decontextualized letters, words, forms of speech,
and so forth. Children who don't get this training, at least according to Heath, have a
much harder time relating to decontextualized school exercises. (Unfortunately, Heath
did not pose the question of whether this mismatch reflects the shortcomings of working-
class child-rearing or the artificiality of decontextualized school exercises.) None of these
abilities are normal; they are quite complex phenomena overlaid on top of the ability to
relate language to present contexts or to evoked but concretely familiar contexts. This
is unfortunate in a way, because it has led to two quite different phenomena--one of
them more fundamental and universal than the other-being run together and confused,
with the later, more articulated phenomenon (the ability to perform certain tricks with
decontextualized representations) getting all the credit.
Two stories about keeping count
Just now I was in the editor moving through a long file of text putting in section
dividers. Each section divider looked like
\section* {a. Introduction}
I would put in a divider, then I would move down through the text a screenful at a time
looking for the right place for a new divider. I had taken the precaution of inserting the
just-mentioned first section divider into the kill ring so I could yank it out into each next
right place. Having done so, I could edit in the correct section letter (b, c, d, ... ) and
type in the title.
The problem was in remembering the correct next letter. It has to be the next letter
in order from the last section's letter, but I couldn't ever remember that last letter with
sufficient assurance. So I kept having to move back and find the previous divider and
check. This settled, rather annoyingly, into a routine of its own, aided by the fact that
the previous search string, now, was always "\se." After three or four of these, I resolved
to remember the letter. After typing a new section divider, I would say the letter to
myself and try to keep it in my head until it got time to type the next one.
When I got to the next place for a section divider, then, I would have a letter in my
head. Unfortunately, though, I wasn't sure whether it was the last letter or the next
letter, so I had to go back and check all over again. I think in each case it was the last
letter, but I was never sure. This went on for a few more letters until I noticed the effect
and started typing this note instead.
This story is analogous to something that happened the first time I ever ran five miles.
It was on a quarter-mile dirt track on the Stanford campus. Five miles on a quarter-mile
track is a lot of laps. The problem was keeping track of the laps. I could keep a number
in my head, but I could never remember with certainty whether it was the number of
laps I had completed or whether it was the number I was about to say when I got to the
start/finish line again. Since each lap took about three days, you see, I spent a lot of
time thinking about that next number along. At the end I ran a couple extra laps to be
sure.
These two stories demonstrate an especially simple case of the indeterminacy of rep-
resentations. The bit of internal speech I was keeping in my head and repeating to myself
originally meant "I have just entered section c" or "I have finished 23 laps," but all I was
repeating to myself was "c" or "23." This was clearly the experience of it: I would say
"c" or "23" to myself, both with and without moving my mouth. These simple strings
have many possible interpretations in various contexts; in these particular contexts two
interpretations came to mind for each of them. Perhaps in a slightly different world I
would have been unsure among three interpretations, or more.
Of course the two competing interpretations were not arbitrary. In each case I knew
perfectly well that the letter or number was in my head because I was trying to label
successive sections or count successive laps. That was all I was doing. But the fact that
I couldn't keep the possible interpretations straight says something to me. It won't do
to interpret these 'values,' "c" and "23," as being kept in specialized registers that were
allocated and assigned fixed meanings by some program. I didn't have a last-section
or last-lap variable whose value got manipulated correctly in virtue of some invariant a
program maintained with regard to it. Instead, I had only a single 'register,' namely my
ability to say some English utterance to myself in my head.
Cognitive psychologists speak of this effect in terms of short term memory's being a
matter of echoic memory, which is to say that you can only keep an utterance 'alive' by
repeating it to yourself. A consequence of this fact is that the contents of 'short term
memory' (whatever that is) suffer from all the difficulties of interpretation of any other
utterance. As with any other representation, using an internal utterance requires doing
work to figure out what in one's current situation the representation is talking about.
Being an 'internal' rather than an 'external' representation does not change this fact.
A story about my routines for
reading the Sunday Globe
This is a story about the indeterminacy of interpretation of plans, a theme I first
outlined in my story about my experiences watching the videotape of two guys putting
together a sofa. Here, though, the plan (if we want to call it that) was something I said
to myself as part of an old and settled routine.
What I'm hypothesizing is that a routine that starts out being mediated by an imper-
ative utterance-even a command you subarticulate to yourself-will still be governed
by all the 'underdetermination' and 'ambiguity' and 'indexicality' and 'ellipsis' of that
utterance, long after you've lost all awareness of any English being involved. Just because
the activity has gotten 'compiled' doesn't mean that the connection between plan-text-
over-here and concrete-situation-out-there becomes any less problematic. Perhaps you
don't ever stop saying the plan-text to yourself (whatever that means); perhaps you only
have routine patterns of acting on it when the conditions are sufficiently (in a qualitative
sense) similar to the conditions that obtained as the routine settled down.
The Boston Globe recently began an expanded (about twenty pages) and loudly
touted arts section in their Sunday edition. Called (foolishly) "Arts Etc," it gathers
together all the Sunday movie, arts, and book reviews, and various arts schedules and
advertising, and throws in some high-brow cultural commentary that occasionally reaches
the intellectual level of the average review in the weekly Boston Phoenix. This section
doesn't have clearly delineated departments except for the last few pages, which are
marked off as the book review pages. The book review department, in fact, is wholly
unchanged from the pre-Arts-Etc Sunday Globe. The first of the book review pages has
its own banner and distinctive format, and all the longer book reviews begin on that page
and continue inside, where there are also shorter reviews and lists of best sellers and so
forth.
Now, it often happens when I am reading the newspaper that I'll come across the
continuation of an article that looks interesting even though I didn't notice it when I was
reading the page on which it began. So I'll have to back up to the earlier page to read
the beginning of the article.
Last Sunday, then, I was reading a book review in the Globe. In particular, I was in
the interior of the book review section, having followed an article from the book review
section's first page (which, let us say, was page C15), when I came upon a headline about
an author I was interested in reading about. Focusing on this headline, I found that it
was a continuation. Whereupon, oddly, I turned to page Cl-i.e., the very front page of
the whole arts section-not to page C15-i.e., the first page of the book review section. I
knew that all the book reviews began on C15, not C1, but I turned to C1 anyway. When
I got C1 in front of me, it was not at all what I expected; momentarily confused, I then
figured out I should turn to C15 instead.
Saying "Cl" and "C15" is of course very misleading here. I don't think I knew what
the correct section or page numbers were. My mistake, I think, turned on my never having
reflected on the somewhat odd relationship between the two pages in question: the book
review section was a clear "part" of the arts section, but the arts section didn't have any
other clear "parts." Both page C1 and page C15-if that's what they were--were the
"front" of something--namely the arts section and the book review section, respectively.
I had long been familiar with the Sunday Globe book review section's format, and its
design and layout did little to make it look like a part of the superordinate arts section.
What I think happened is this. When I went to turn to the beginning of the review
I wanted to read, I turned to "the front," perhaps even "the front of the section." I'm
not sure exactly what I mean by double-quoting those two English phrases, but I want
to mean something fairly literal. That is, I think I made my mistake because I was
saying something to myself in English, either subarticulately or wholly within my head
(whatever that means), and the phrase in question was ambiguous and I interpreted it
wrongly.
I've been reading newspapers for at least fifteen years and Boston Sunday Globe book
reviews for almost ten years. Stumbling upon the continuation of an article and wanting
to find its beginning is a routine I've probably been through many hundreds of times.
And at least a couple dozen of these episodes must have occurred during my reading of
the Sunday Globe's book reviews.
I should stop to wonder why I knew to turn to the "front" of the section, since not
all articles in the rest of the paper start at fronts of sections. Perhaps at some point I
articulated to myself the fact that the book reviews start at the front of the book review
section. I don't think I actually inspected the page number in the phrase "Continued
from page C15." But a plausible alternative is that I knew that I was only a single page
into the section, if only because I know that the book review section is only a few pages
long, which meant that a continued article could only have started on the front page.
So this was not the first time I've said "go to the front of the section" to myself in
my head in such a situation. This internal uttering-to-myself and the actions I typically
have occasion to take in consequence of it must certainly have worn deep grooves in my
brain by now. You might think that it was so thoroughly 'compiled' that it no longer
resembled English. Yet still it was capable of this very language-like underspecification
of the situation. I still had to figure out what the English phrase was referring to in this
specific concrete situation, and even though this figuring occurred perfectly automatically,
smoothly, and routinely, it was still problematic-just as problematic, perhaps, as it was
the first time, at least in the sense that it was still possible to get it wrong.
So "the front of the section" was ambiguous in this situation. But all of this still
doesn't explain why, on the particular moment in question, it led me to turn to C1
rather than C15. Before the Globe reformatted and ballyhooed its silly "Arts Etc," I
had never given any particular thought to the idea of the Sunday Globe having an "arts
section." In fact I clearly recall the first Sunday of the new section: the front page of
the paper-i.e., Al-had an ad for it that caught my eye, and despite the dippy name
I decided to give it a fair try. And in fact it contained a fairly perceptive article about
the Soviet cimena, whose best recent product (a film called "Repentance") I had recently
been very impressed by. The matter of "the Globe's new arts section"--in exactly those
words-had thus clearly been on my mind. I don't want to conclude that the arts-section
interpretation was 'stronger' than the book-review-section interpretation, but whatever is
operating as we constantly use background information to 'fill in the details' of utterances
when determining their relevance to particular concrete situations was operating here as
well.
A story about the
file cabinet in my office
Background: the file cabinet in my office
I've got a file cabinet in my office. It has five drawers, but until recently I only had
files in the top three. The bottom two were storage for a bunch of junk, much of which
was left over from when I shared the cabinet with Daniel Weise-empty files whose tabs
had Daniel's handwriting, a pile of Time magazines from back when I was interested in
naive argumentation, a couple bags of mardi gras trinkets, a now-empty box of blank
cassette tapes, etc.
When I was doing my taxes, I finally cleared up a pile of papers that'd been gathering
in the vegetable crate I keep on my desk. The crate contained some files in yellow folders
for personal stuff-taxes and MIT bills and bank statements and travel records-but
most of the papers were unfiled, just heaped at the end of the slumped-over row of files.
So I made files for many of these papers: I sorted them into piles and recruited a new
hanging file folder for each new category of papers-taxes, MIT, Oxford, airlines, my car,
job-hunting, credit cards, etc.
Each drawer of this file cabinet has a distinct category of stuff. I have a hard time
remembering what the categories are, but when I need a file I almost invariably head for
it without any thought or hesitation.
Top drawer: sources for my published papers, e.g., drafts and figures
Second drawer: papers filed by subject (e.g., biology) instead of author-
papers by author are in the cabinet out in the hall
Third drawer: copies of papers to give away, both my own and friends'
So when I assembled these new files, even though the third drawer had plenty of room
for the new files I recruited a new file drawer for the new category-personal papers. I
threw out most of the junk that had been living in the fourth drawer, shuffled the rest
elsewhere, and inserted the new files in that drawer.
What happens
That's the history, here's the phenomenon. I often have occasion now to find one of
these personal files, either to fetch something or to stash something that arrived in the
mail. When I do so, however, I very often find myself opening the third drawer instead
of the fourth.
Why is this? My guess is as follows. I'll bet that I often thought of the third/papers-
to-give-away drawer as the "bottom drawer." When Daniel and I shared the file cabinet,
the top drawers were mine and the bottom ones were his. I believe he used the bottom
drawers for his personal files because they were easy to reach when he was sitting in his
chair at his desk. I took the top couple drawers, leaving a sort of no-man's-land in the
middle, which was just as well since it saved us the bother of explicitly apportioning
the cabinet. When I recruited the third drawer-I believe it was after Daniel left-it
was "the bottom drawer," meaning something like "the bottom one of my drawers."
When I went to get a paper to hand out, I went to "the bottom drawer" or "the bottom
occupied drawer" or something like that. The drawers with Time Magazines and stuff
in them were just a junk heap; the stuff in them was there because the space happened
to be vacant, not because the space was specifically assigned to them. These bottom
two junk-storage drawers were definitely a grey area in my experience of the room; since
I had never deliberately explored them or arranged them or assigned them a purpose,
psychically I did not 'own' them. Once Daniel owned them; now they were orphans.
So now I recruited one of these outside drawers. The fifth drawer-the actual phys-
ically bottom drawer of the cabinet-is still out in the forest, but now I've cleared the
fourth drawer and annexed it to my personal space. So when I go for this drawer to
retrieve some personal papers, it's "the bottom drawer." The part of me that relates the
quasi-linguistic string-actually I tend to think of it as a routinized internal utterance-
"the bottom drawer" to the physical file cabinet, I suspect, hasn't heard the news. It's
in the habit of turning "open the bottom drawer" into the actions that open the third
drawer.
Why do I think that it's "the bottom drawer" rather than some other description?
To say that it's "the personal files drawer" begs the question since that's not especially
operational; most likely I know that "the personal files are in the bottom drawer" or
something like that. Most likely it's not "the fourth drawer," since I can't think of any
reason to believe that this would lead to any action except the correct one.
One slightly different possibility does make sense. Perhaps it's "the next drawer
down," that is, the description I used back when I recruited the third drawer. If the part
of me that fetches files still thinks of the file drawer as the top drawers plus an extra
drawer that I've annexed, then I'm not going to have any ready way to distinguish the
third and fourth drawers, both of which have been "the next drawer down" at different
times.
What I'm trying to figure out here
Implicit in both this story and the Boston-Globe-arts-section story are some ideas
I'm trying to work out about representation and action.
1) Writing model of representation. I tried to define this in "Writing as good
and bad metaphor for representation." I mean the writing metaphor in a
particular sense, the less prevalent, "good" sense, which asks you to think
of a representation as something that's not part of you. It is, as we say, "a
resource in situated action." A representation doesn't have a once-and-for-
all meaning. Instead, you have to make sense of it in each next situation.
There are no complete or systematic or guaranteed rules for this making-
sense. And when you do manage to figure out what in some situation some
representation is talking about, there is no way to finish listing what about
the situation enabled you to do this.
2) Dependency model of routine evolution. All forms of activity are snap-
shots in the evolution of routines. The routines themselves are complicatedly
intertwined around the patterns of society and the physical layout of partic-
ular places. The model is, when you think a new thought (whatever that
means) in some situation, you construct a dependency circuit connecting the
thought's premises to its conclusion. When you believe those same premises
again (whatever that means) in some future situation, the dependency circuit
reasserts the conclusion.
I'm trying to connect these two ideas. I want to portray most concrete activity as
involving routinized representation-using-where I mean the writing model of 'using'
representations. The writing model talks about "making sense of a representation in
each next situation by figuring out what in the situation it is talking about." So, to take
an example of Chapman's, "turn left" might engender a variety of different actions in
different situations.
Now this each-next-situation business sounds like a lot of work. If it really required
a fresh, novel effort to make sense of "turn left" or "open the bottom drawer" on every
moment of every day then we'd never be able to do anything. But I don't think it's
that bad. What you have in practice is a patchwork of routinized methods that have
worked in various situations in the past. The methods themselves have accumulated
by dependency maintenance. In some past situation someone said "take the next left"
and you took certain specific concrete actions did figure out what this meant you should
do: you looked around, you performed visual operations, maybe you walked around and
looked at various things, and so forth. You had your own various reasons for doing all
these things, and all the actions and all their reasons got recorded by the dependency
network, so now it's ready and waiting to happen again in new situations. In subsequent
situations some or all of the reasons might not have applied, so instead you took various
other actions, and these themselves led to new dependency circuitry.
Perhaps after enough of this you assemble enough routines to apply "turn left" to
almost all of the left-turn situations you encounter in the average day. You've developed
habits of interpretation. So whenever you tell yourself--or someone else tells you-"turn
left" you'll be able to do it right away, 'automatically,' without any hesitation or difficult
figuring-out.
These routines, like all routines, will evolve. Very often the evolution of a routine
involving a representation will permit you to undertake the activity without the repre-
sentation actually being present. For example, using a recipe ten times will often let
you make the dish without referring to the recipe. One precondition for this effect seems
to be that you understand the reasons for the recipe's instructions, but this is a vague
idea that needs to be twisted around uncomfortably to fit the actual phenomena. In any
event, there's an important sense in which the representation itself never goes away. Even
when you're routinely deciding to turn left or add salt, you're still-in some sense I wish
I understood-saying the utterance "turn left" or "salt to taste" to yourself, and you're
still interpreting it just like any other natural-language utterance you need to relate to a
concrete situation.
Now, where do effects like the arts-section page-turning mistake and the bottom-file-
drawer mistake come from? Habits of interpretation are just that, habits. When you
store a dependency record, you store a list of reasons why the action is a good one. But
this list cannot be complete. The success of your actions always depends on aspects of
the current situation that you've never articulated. If these aspects change and nothing
brings the change-or more accurately, the relevance of the change to your habitual line
of reasoning-to your attention, your routine might lead you into a mistake. This, I
suspect, is what happened in both cases. The Boston Globe changed its arts section's
format so that two different pages might count as "the front page" and my file cabinet
changed so that a different drawer counted as "the bottom drawer" (or "the bottom one
of my drawers" or whatever it was).
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